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EU Accession and the Changing Business-Government Relationship in Post-
Communist Europe 
The introduction of state ownership during communist rule fundamentally blurred 
the organizational boundaries between government and business. The state became the 
sole employer – private employers were non-existent, while the business function of state 
enterprises was highly politicized. The latter were controlled by the party-state through 
central planning and the nomenklatura system of recruitment and appointments. 
Central plan meant direct bureaucratic management of the economy by 
institutions of the state. The central plan rather than market mechanisms designated what 
enterprises should produce and at what cost. It further designated the suppliers and 
customers for enterprises, the general framework for pay scales and terms of employment. 
Investment was provided primarily by the state, which in turn had the right to income 
earned by enterprises and organizations under its ownership. The abundance of 
administrative orders for sales, marketing and distribution resulted in lack of initiative 
and entrepreneurship. Competition was considered wasteful and unnecessary in a system 
of soft budget constraints (Kornai, 1980; 1992).
1 Managers were thus not decision makers 
but only implementers of decisions taken at higher political level—the main function of 
enterprise directors was the fulfillment of plan targets. Through the nomenklatura system, 
managers were appointed on the basis of political not professional criteria. The total party 
control over enterprises and the economy was further secured by the appointment of party 
secretaries in all major places of work.  
Not surprisingly, it took years for the transformation of this highly rigid 
bureaucratic system of corporate activity into a new pro-market, pro-competitive 
                                                 
1 Hungarian economist Janos Kornai identifies a set of mechanisms in the socialist economy, all of which 
lead to a softening of a firm’s budget constraints: (1) soft subsidies mean that firms operate in an 
environment in which they expect that negotiations with planning authorities will yield additional funds; 
(2) soft taxation indicates that bargaining can reduce tax burdens for specific firms or industries; (3) soft 
credit denotes firms’ ability to plead to the state bank for additional loans or alter the terms of existing debt; 
(4) soft administrative pricing refers to the practice of altering administratively set prices to provide funds 
to a given branch of industry or producer of a specific good. These practices are a matter of degree but 
together they point to an environment in which firms tend not to be responsive to price shifts nor are they 
profit maximizers. In Kornai’s classical theory, the main “softening” action is a two-step process: in step 
one, the firm has fixed budget and a target quantity of output; in step two, the firm overspends the budget – 
using a greater quantity of inputs or excessive labor (costs) – and the state clears the debts through a 
subsidy or budget reconciliation.   3
corporate performance system, and for the emergence of a new type of business relations 
with the state based on the organizational and political independence of the former from 
the latter. As many observers of the region have noticed, in the initial years of post-
communist transformation business success continued to be dependent upon political 
connections, and political, rent-seeking strategies of obtaining special privileges from 
state bureaucracies were a common practice. Furthermore, for a long time enterprise 
managers retained paternalistic corporate goals, rooted in the extensive social welfare 
functions of enterprises under communism. Priority was overwhelmingly put on 
maintaining and creating secure employment rather than reducing it in the name of pro-
market goals such as economic efficiency, competitiveness and growth. 
How did the accession of central and eastern European (CEE) countries into the 
European Union (EU) affect these legacies of the business-government relationship? Did 
the emerging post-communist businesses see EU membership as a means of securing a 
faster transition towards a more western, pro-market type of business strategy and 
operation, or as an additional threat to the survivability of enterprises? What was the 
impact of accession-driven adaptational pressures on business organization and strategy, 
especially on its relationship with government? While there is already an abundance of 
literature on EU accession and domestic adaptation (see, for example, Linden, 2002; 
Jacoby, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Seledmeier, 2005), especially on EU conditionality 
(Grabbe, 2006; Hughes et al., 2004; Schimmelfennig et al., 2005) and individual policy 
cases such as the restructuring of state administration and building its capacity to 
implement the EU common law or environmental transformation (Andonova, 2004; 
Vachudova, 2004), very little systemic study has been devoted to the business-
government relationship and business per se as an agent in the EU accession process. 
Even for EU member states, little attention has been paid to the Europeanization of the 
business-government relationship. There are works that point to EU-level business-
government relations or the actions of national groups in Brussels (Van Schendelen, 
1993), there are also some works that focus on the Europeanization of business (Kassim 
and Menon, 1996), but only a few studies focus on the business-government relationship 
per se (Cowles, 2001; Schmidt, 1996a, 1996b; Lavdas, 1997). This is surprising given the 
fact that business has always been a champion of European integration, and that specific   4
configurations of business-government relations at the EU level and the domestic level of 
member states have largely determined the outcome of integrative processes across 
Europe.
2 
More specifically, business has persistently regarded the deepening and widening 
of integrative processes in Europe as the major means of increased corporate 
competitiveness in the global economy. While national governments of member states 
worried about possible loss of sovereignty it was business through its organizations in 
Brussels that lobbied persuasively them to overcome national sovereignty issues and 
embrace the ideas of a common market and increased liberalization, e.g. the removal of 
barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labor in Europe. European 
business further argued that the single market must be completed with a single currency, 
and lobbied for the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that has led to the creation of an 
economic and monetary union and the introduction of a single currency, the Euro. 
Persistently, European business has also promoted the widening of the Union, and has 
supported its enlargement rounds, including the most recent one, to the east. 
  Using an institutionalist approach grounded in the comparative Europeanization 
literature, this study explores institutional change in the business-government relationship 
in the EU acceding countries from the post-communist region. Similar to the neo-pluralist 
(societal) approach (see Nowell, 1996), the institutionalist approach emphasizes the 
importance of business-state alliances in determining political and policy outcomes and 
the fulfillment of business strategic objectives. Unlike the neo-pluralist approach, 
however, which emphasizes primarily the desire of business to control the state (Gibbs, 
1991; Cox, 1994; Ferguson, 1983, 1984, 1995; Ferguson and Rogers, 1986; Frieden, 
1988; Abraham, 1986), the institutionalist approach counts for the goals of business, but 
regards these goals as significantly constrained – defined and shaped – by institutions.
3 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the webpages of BusinessEurope, the Confederation of European Business 
(http://www.businesseurope.eu/Content/Default.asp?), and ERT, the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (http://www.ert.be/home.aspx) - the two major business formations at the EU level. 
3 Institutions are understood in this study as the structures that human beings impose on their interactions, 
or as coherent systems of shared (enforced) norms and rules that regulate individual interactions in 
recurrent situations. They comprise formal rules and informal constraints. The formal rules refer to 
legislation, court decisions, and regulations of the executive and various regulatory agencies. Formalized 
institutions provide written norms and procedures prescribing behavior. The informal constraints are norms 
of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct that are combined with the enforcement   5
Institutions have always played a vital role in the EU integrative processes, including EU 
accession; the European Union is a polity heavily grounded in institutions (Katzenstein, 
1997). What matters most in the case of European integration are the European common 
law, the acquis communautaire, and the EU common policy content and procedures. As 
Christopher Preston observes, the requirements that EU candidate countries take on board 
the entire acquis communautaire with no permanent derogations allowed; and that the 
accession negotiations concentrate exclusively on the practical aspects of the adoption of 
the acquis by the applicants, stand on top of the list of principles applied in all EU 
enlargement rounds (Preston, 1997). These requirements consequently define EU 
integration and more specifically the EU enlargement process as a highly institutionalized 
one. 
By focusing on the business-government relationship in the EU accession 
countries from CEE, this study addresses the questions, in which way and to what extent 
does the EU exercise its influence on this relationship? The study has two intertwined 
goals in that regard: on the one hand, to broadly outline and explain the specific pattern 
of the Europeanization of the business-government relationship as a result of the 
adaptational pressures of EU accession; and, on the other – to trace the effectiveness of 
this relationship in facilitating the preparedness of an EU acceding country for EU entry 
(See Figure 1a). 
It is important to emphasize the methodological difficulty in trying to 
disaggregate European integration as an independent source of change in the business-
government relationship in the accession countries from CEE. In practice it has always 
been difficult to isolate European effects and to disentangle effects of European 
arrangements from global, national and sub-national sources of change (Olsen, 2002: 14; 
Risse et al, 2001: 4). For the CEE countries specifically, EU conditionality went hand in 
hand with the efforts of other international organizations to link transformation incentives 
with the fundamental political principles of the western world, such as the norms of 
human rights and liberal democracy, and the institutions of the market economy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
characteristics of both. Informal aspects of institutions usually encompass informal collective 
understandings and beliefs, and informal networks among executives and interest groups (March and 
Olsen, ; Sjöstrand, 1993: 9; North, 1993: 36).   6
EU Accession
Business-Government 
Relationship
Domestic Preparation 
for EU Accession
Figure 1a
 
The methodological difficulty is even greater, having in mind the interwoven 
processes of post-communist transformation and EU accession. The borders between EU 
accession and post-communist transformation were not clear from the very start of the 
integration efforts, because EU membership was regarded as both a means and a goal of 
post-communist transformation. Even if we accept that much of the adaptational 
pressures had come from the EU in various forms and channels, such pressures did not 
necessarily target the goal of EU membership per se. They built on the basis of foreign 
aid conditionality for the smooth post-communist transition toward democratic 
institutions and market economies. The three Copenhagen conditions for accession 
elaborated in 1993 were equally important for the development of democracy and a 
market economy in the CEE region.
4 
Perhaps important domestic changes in the direction of political democratization 
and the creation of functioning and internationally competitive market economies would 
have occurred anyhow, without the prospect of EU accession. Yet the scope and speed of 
these changes might have been significantly different.
5 Similarly, during the southern 
                                                 
4 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier made an attempt to differentiate these influences by distinguishing two 
main contexts of Europeanization in CEE: democratic conditionality, and acquis conditionality. Democratic 
conditionality refers to transition pressures concerning the general EU rules of liberal democracy applied in 
the very first years of post-communist transformation. The acquis conditionality refers to EU accession 
pressures, applied at a later stage when enlargement became a goal of the EU, roughly from 1995 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005c: 211-212). 
5 Some observers see the speed and scope of transformation as strongly correlated with successful 
preparation for accession. The more a country is advanced in liberalization, efficient privatization, 
restructuring and international competitiveness, the better it is able to face the challenges of adjustment to 
conditions of EU membership (Inotai, 1999: 3). Others tend to assume consecutive processes, to view   7
enlargement of the EU in the 1980s, the theme of modernization had been considerably 
interwoven with the political discourse of EU accession. In Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
modernization had often been equated with an approximation to western European norms 
and practices (Featherstone 1998; Borras-Alomar, 1999). 
In order to overcome these methodological difficulties while addressing the above 
stated questions, research and analysis were organized around an in-depth case study of 
the business-government relationship in one accession country – Bulgaria. Examining 
patterns of interdependencies and causalities in one particular country, industry by 
industry, region by region and company by company is essential in identifying the key 
elements of the pattern of change and the intervening factors that affect the business-
government relationship. The selection of several sub-national case studies of industries, 
local regions and companies, permits research to be carried out into the complex 
interactions between business and government at local, regional and national levels. It is 
precisely these detailed analyses of linkages and networks that allow for the elaboration 
of a model of accession-driven institutional change in the business-government 
relationship, or a model of its Europeanization. 
The study demonstrates the path through which Bulgaria – a classic example of 
the Soviet socioeconomic system
6 – refocused itself to pursue EU membership. On the 
one hand, the Bulgarian case has a lot of common features with the changing business-
government relations in the other CEE countries – new EU members because EU 
accession has evolved as a highly uniform process. The EU conditionality required the 
introduction of the same laws and regulations in each country which is aspiring for EU 
membership. At the same time permanent derogations were not allowed – the candidate 
countries had to take on board the entire acquis communautaire with accession 
                                                                                                                                                 
integration as the crowning moment, the final stage of the economic and political transformation of CEE 
applicants for EU membership – not merely a process of adapting to external conditions (Kolarska-
Bobinska, 1999). Still others point to existing tensions between the transformation of the political, 
economic and social structures and the process of integration with the EU. Membership of the EU (together 
with NATO membership) became the primary goal of the post-communist transforming countries, and it 
put a lot of pressure on the institutional and organizational capacities and value orientations of potential 
new members (Widmaier, 1999). 
6 During state socialism, more than any other nation in the Soviet Bloc region, Bulgaria’s 
economy was patterned closely after the Soviet system, with a massive heavy-industrial sector, huge agro-
industrial complexes, and ever-increasing urban concentrations and depopulation of the countryside 
(McIntyre, 1988). Observers called it the “most Soviet” of the Eastern European states (Pickles et al., 
1998).   8
negotiations concentrating only on the practical aspects of the adoption of the acquis by 
the applicants. As Christopher Preston observed, this principle stands on top of the list of 
principles applied in all rounds of EU enlargement. Changing the “rules of the EU club” 
is possible only after accession, when new members could express their individual 
preferences in the decision-making process of the EU and try to change the rules through 
the accepted decision-making principles and procedures of the EU (Preston, 1997). That 
is why the findings of this study provide general insights that are also applicable to other 
new members of the EU from the formerly communist region. 
On the other hand, the Bulgarian case differs from other CEE applicants for EU 
membership on the basis of the individualism of post-communist transformations, and the 
speed of preparedness for EU membership. As some authors have observed, the 
uniformity of integration contrasted with the individualism of transformations (Widmaier, 
1999). In contrast to the 2004 entrants, Bulgaria lagged behind in the level of its 
economic restructuring and transformation, and hence in fulfillment of the EU economic 
conditions for accession. Although the country was not directly involved in the Balkan 
conflicts of the 1990s, its economy and emerging businesses suffered the consequences 
of political instability in the region, causing reduced investor confidence, postponement 
of needed structural reforms, and general economic malaise. However, important 
domestic factors such as the lack of political and legal transparency and the proliferation 
of corruption and clientelism due to close relations between political and economic elites 
also played a role for the poor economic performance. Overall, Bulgaria’s prolonged 
preparedness for EU membership in the economic/business realm makes it an excellent 
case study of the evolving changes in the business-government relationship as a result of 
EU accession. 
 
What is to Change in the Business-Government Relationship? 
The model of business-government relations in general is often constructed as a 
model of interdependence and reciprocity (Samuels, 1987; Chick, 1990; Moran and 
Wright, 1991; Lavdas, 1997). The assumption is that governments and businesses are 
bound in a relation of interdependence by virtue of some of the most profound   9
characteristics of the social systems in which they are embedded. Yet the relationship has 
clearly identifiable components, such as character, structure, and composition. 
 
Character of the Business-Government Relationship: Adversarial vs. Cooperative 
The character of the business-government relationship is rooted in the conflict – 
collaboration continuum, and is determined by the extent of substantive inter-penetration 
of business and government. That is, on the one hand, the extent to which governments 
intervene in industry or limit themselves to macroeconomic policies intended to promote 
economic growth, and, on the other, the extent to which business is involved in the 
policy-making process. There are three distinct modes of a business-government 
relationship based on the degree of state involvement in the economy, and the degree of 
business involvement in the policy-making process. They have virtually defined three 
distinct types of capitalism – neo-liberal, statist, and corporatist (Katzenstein, 1984 
&1985; Wilson, 1990). 
In the neo-liberal, Anglo-Saxon model (typical for the U.S. and the U.K.), 
primarily market forces determine the allocation of investment and the coordination of 
different factors of production. The role of the state is to secure a business environment 
conducive to business’s success by maintaining the institutional infrastructure needed for 
commercial activity (such as a system of law) and by steering the economy at the macro 
level in order to avoid recessions or inflations. The character of business-government 
relations is more adversarial rather than cooperative. The major political task for business 
in this model is to lobby for the reduction of taxes or regulations which cost business 
money.  
Under the statist model (as practiced in Japan but also France), the state itself 
fulfils extended functions and takes a close interest in the strategies and activities of 
corporations. The greater government involvement in the economy is based on its 
leadership role – that is, identifying markets and products which are likely to grow in the 
future.
7 Advocates of such a major, direct role for government in making investment 
decisions argue that government is capable of taking a longer term, more informed view 
                                                 
7 For details on the statist perspective, see more in Zysman, 1983; Johnson, 1982; Dyson and Wilks, 1983; 
Wilks and Wright, 1987.   10
of the prospects for growth and investment than is the individual corporation (Wilson, 
1990). The state also has a mediating role between powerful interests such as business 
and labor in order to promote consensus on the measures needed to achieve growth.  
Under the corporatist model, the state also exercises an extensive involvement in 
the economy but in tandem with business and other organizations of civil society. The 
interventionist state in the corporatist model seeks partnerships with business and other 
economic interests such as labor by promoting the growth of interest groups which, in 
turn, have a say in government policy and assist government by promoting and helping to 
implement government policies among their members. Through such partnerships, the 
most promising prospects for future economic growth are identified and resources are 
steered to those sectors. 
A variation in the business-government relationship along the lines of the 
conflict-cooperation continuum stems also from variation in policy-making patterns 
across policy areas – regulatory, distributive and redistributive (Lowi, 1964; 1972). 
Regulation constitutes an arena of pluralist politics and pluralist competition over 
outcomes. By contrast, distribution concerns the allocation of public funds in accordance 
with log-rolling coalitions among various actors with often uncommon interests, leading 
to distributive bargains. Finally, redistributive policies concern the redistribution of social 
income among social groups (social policy) or territorial units (regional policy) and are 
associated with more stable interest coalitions. 
 
Structure of the Business-Government Relationship: Degree of Institutionalization 
The structure of the business-government relationship refers to the degree of 
formalization and institutionalization of the channels of communication between business 
and government, such as consultation procedures, councils, commissions, and others. The 
degree of institutionalization is the major dimension along which government-business 
relations vary in different contexts. The more institutionalized the government-business 
relation the more it will involve encompassing organizations and formalized channels of 
interaction governed by elaborate rules and norms. 
The relationship between business and government is structured or 
institutionalized differently under each of the three major models of capitalism. In the   11
neo-liberal model, the business-government relationship is less institutionalized. Dealings 
between government and business are conducted by government either with numerous 
competing business organizations of uncertain status or directly with individual 
corporations. The model of neo-corporatism is characterized with the highest levels of 
institutionalization, although close consultation between business and government also 
occurs in the statist model of France and Japan, but this consultation is generally routed 
through highly developed business organizations (Wilson, 1990: 23). 
The business-government interaction could be also realized through less formal 
institutional channels, especially networks of personal relationships. The implications for 
policy, including economic policy, are described in the literature as typically negative. 
Rent-seeking, clientelism and collusion among politicians, interested bureaucrats, and 
organized constituencies typically permit policies that favor narrow interests over the 
common good. But, as Haggard et al. note, expectations about the consequences of 
personal networks are not uniformly negative. It has long been recognized that formal 
organizations and institutional hierarchies are interlaced with informal networks that 
strongly affect their performance. The positive light on networks is that they can promote 
the two-way flow of information between government and private sector, which in turn 
enhances policy design and subsequent adjustment. To the extent that networks build 
reciprocity and trust, they benefit the economic policy process by lowering transactions 
costs between government and business and minimizing the likelihood of policy 
stalemates. Networks are also beneficial to the extent that they increase transparency 
because this raises the costs of individual rent seeking (Haggard et al., 1997: 54). 
 
Composition of the Business-Government Relationship: A Multiplicity of Actors 
The composition of the business-government relationship refers to the concrete 
actors that are involved in the relationship on each side. Both the state and business are 
not homogenous entities but comprise a multiplicity of sub-units. In the business-
government relationship the state is regarded not just as a forum within which competing 
or conflicting social forces contend for control so that they can use state powers for their 
own purposes, but as a relatively independent actor with its own objectives and interests 
that cannot be reduced to those of any interest group, even one as important as business   12
(Skocpol, 1985). In the business-government relationship, the state acts as both a 
legislator, an executive, and a judiciary. The political party dimension of the state is also 
important in that regard. 
Business is also not a homogeneous unit but has two important dimensions: on the 
one hand, it can be desegregated into capital, sector, and firm (or possessing common, 
industry-specific and firm-specific needs and interests); and on the other – into political 
organization and political representation.
8 Businesses as factors of production or capital 
emphasize common interests vis-à-vis the state such as the protection of property rights 
and the creation of a favorable business climate (Lindblom, 1984; Hirschman, 1978)
9. 
However, businesses also have divergent interests when it comes to particular public 
policies and sectors. In this case, rent seeking can become an important aspect of the 
business-government relationship (Olson, 1982; Krueger, 1974). In the business-as-firm 
case, characteristics of corporate structure, including size, internal organization, 
ownership, and patterns of financing, seem to affect both business preferences and the 
leverage that firms have vis-à-vis government actors. Two organizational dimensions – 
the relative size of major firms, and the extent of diversification within particular firms or 
groups – can have especially important implications for relations between government 
and business.
10  
In the case of business as political organization, the focus is on the institutions 
that mediate business interests, or on how business associations and interest groups 
aggregate, reconcile, and intermediate business interests (Silva, 1997; Doner and Ramsay, 
1997; Biddle and Milor, 1997; Thorp and Durand, 1997; Schneider, 1997), as well as 
how they influence policy making through lobbying, and policy implementation through 
                                                 
8 In addition to capital, sector, firm, and organization, Haggard et al. (1997: 36-37) add also networks to the 
desegregation of business. However, their understanding of business-as-networks refers more to the 
specific mode of interaction with government which comes not through formal institutional channels but 
through networks of personal relationships. 
9 See Winters 1994, 1996; Cohen 1996; Haggard, Lee and Maxfield, 1993 for full reviews of the literature 
on business as capital. It is important to note in this regard the structural aspects of business power. Authors 
such as Lindblom (1977) have stressed that business leaders are not just another interest group; in market 
societies they dispose of real power because they have been entrusted with the power to decide whether and 
where to invest in the new processes which are vital to the future prosperity of the whole community. If 
business leaders feel that the conditions are not right for investment, then that investment will not be made 
(Wilson, 1990: 11). States compete with each other to attract industry by having the lowest corporate taxes 
and in other ways creating a favorable business environment. 
10 On the rising role of firms in business-government relations see more in Grant, 1987; Cowles, 2001.   13
private-interest governance, where business associations assume governmental functions. 
The role of business associations in mediating relations between government officials and 
capitalists is generally seen as one that can enhance economic performance. First, 
business associations can maximize the positive effects of government-business 
collaboration by limiting the pursuit of particularistic interests. Second, associations can 
promote collective self-governance of business, or private-interest governance, that can 
be equally if not more efficient and effective than direct state intervention or regulation 
(Haggard et al., 1997: 49). The political party connections and political representation of 
businesses are also an important aspect of the composition of the business-government 
relationship. It has been argued that the strength of pro-business political parties in 
western democracies has been more beneficial to business interests than the activities of 
business interest groups (Wilson, 1990: 24). But in general, in order to secure electoral 
success, even pro-business parties have to put some distance between themselves and 
business interests (Mills, 1956; Useem, 1984; Drew, 1983; Etzioni, 1984). 
 
Towards a Model of Accession-Driven Institutional Change in the Business-
Government Relationship 
How to understand deliberate, accession-driven institutional change in the 
business-government relationship in EU accession countries? Obviously the starting point 
is its potential source since it is well-known – that is, accession to the EU. However, 
accession is a very broad process encompassing a variety of situations, factors and 
interactions. Hence it is necessary to identify those elements of the EU accession process 
which act as determinants (independent variable) of the changing business-government 
relationship in the acceding countries (dependent variable). 
The effect of EU accession on CEE’s domestic politics, policies, and institutions – 
including business organization and business-government relations – has often been 
referred to as Europeanization. The term Europeanization is used very broadly, however, 
often as a synonym of European integration. Olsen outlines at least five different 
meanings of Europeanization which, as he concludes, after all are rather complementary,   14
not exclusive (Olsen, 2002: 2-3)
11. The focus of this study is on one of these meanings – 
Europeanization through enlargement, or as a process of institutionalization taking place 
when the EU expands its boundaries. Europeanization through enlargement focuses on 
the relationship between the expanding organization – the EU, and its prospective 
members, from the perspective of the domestic institutions and actors of the latter. Thus, 
the questions that informs this study are: under what conditions would the accession 
process provoke change in the business-government relationship in EU acceding 
countries; and in what direction – towards greater collaboration or greater divisions and 
adversities, greater or lesser institutionalization, and greater or lesser actor involvement 
in the relationship on both sides?  
Crucial for this study is the focus on preparedness for EU membership. In 
outlining the degree of domestic change as a result of EU accession, the concepts of 
“goodness of fit” and “policy misfits” have been widely applied (Caporaso et al., 1998; 
Börzel, 1998, 1999; Risse and Börzel, 2003; Cowles et al., 2001). The claim is that a 
misfit between European-level and domestic processes, policies, or institutions 
constitutes the necessary condition for expecting any change. There must be some degree 
of misfit or incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and institutions, 
on the one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions, on the other. 
This degree of fit or misfit constitutes adaptational pressures. Adaptational pressures 
alone are not sufficient for expecting change, there must be some facilitating factors 
(actors or institutions) that are responding to the adaptational pressures. These mediating 
factors enable or prohibit domestic change.  
However, because of the high mixture of post-communist transformation with 
integration efforts to meet the complex set of EU accession criteria, the goodness of fit 
approach is generally less applicable to the would-be EU members from CEE. The 
                                                 
11 First, Europeanization is considered to be a process taking place when the EU expands its boundaries 
through enlargement, and concerns third countries or applicants for EU membership. Second, 
Europeanization is understood as the adaptation of national and sub-national systems of governance of 
member states to a European political center and European-wide norms. Third, Europeanization is regarded 
as the development of institutions of governance at the European level. Fourth, the term Europeanization 
has been used to point to exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and 
distinct for Europe beyond the European territory. And finally, Europeanization is regarded as a political 
project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe (Olsen, 2002: 2-3). Another definition is offered 
by Schimmelfennig and Seledmeier who regard Europeanization as a process of rule adoption (a process in 
which states adopt EU rules (Schimmelfennig and Seledmeier, 2005b: 7).   15
concept “degree of preparedness” seems to be more suitable in exploring domestic 
change in the course of CEE’s accession to the EU. Similarly to the concepts of “policy 
misfits” and “goodness of fit,” the concept of “preparedness” also looks at the degree of 
fit between the various levels of the institutionalization process (Sjöstrand, 1993: 13-14). 
It identifies potential gaps, mismatches, tensions and frictions between the micro, or 
national level of applicant countries, and the macro, or the EU supranational level. The 
gap is the distance between the experiences of the many single individuals at the micro-
level (applicant countries) and the regulations embedded in the more formalized 
institutions at the macrolevel (the EU) (Börzel, 1998; Risse et al., 2001). However, with 
the concept of degree of preparedness, the starting point of change is of less analytical 
importance, compared to the goodness-of-fit and policy-misfits approach. The focus is 
put on the end-goal – that is, EU membership. 
In the case of CEE applicants for EU membership, the domestic institutions and 
structures cannot be taken as “givens.” In the course of post-communist transformation, 
CEE experienced considerable pressures for adaptation and adjustment. Even fifteen 
years after the 1989 revolutions, their domestic structures remain much less stable than 
those of the EU member states. In addition, in many ways processes of 
institutionalization ab ovo (or from the very beginning) emerged, shaped by international 
conditionalities on granting post-communist financial aid to the region. Adaptational 
pressures from the EU (mismatches between EU requirements and domestic conditions) 
are thus undoubtedly very substantial, and the degree of preparedness reflects the level of 
harmonization of domestic institutions and structures with the EU standards, norms and 
procedures. 
This study identifies the sources (or mechanisms) of change in the business-
government relationship as these three aspects of the process of EU accession: first, the 
legal conditionalities and harmonization efforts for EU entry; second, the pre-accession 
and anticipated post-accession financial assistance with its specific priorities and 
requirements; and third, the capacity building and learning that ultimately stems from the 
efforts to adapt to the EU conditionalities of membership. The first two accession factors 
reflect a logic of consequences, while the third one – a logic of appropriateness. The first 
two thus assume strategic, instrumentally rational actors who seek to maximize their own   16
power and welfare (the rational choice institutionalism); the third one assumes actors who 
are motivated by internalized identities, values, and norms (the sociological 
institutionalism). Thus actors are driven by the logic of consequences or the sanctions 
(conditionality) and rewards (financial assistance) of the EU. They are also driven by the 
logic of appropriateness, or an EU-specific collective identity and an EU-specific set of 
common values and norms (March and Olsen, 1989, 160-162).
12 
EU accession (legal conditionalities, financial assistance, capacity building) 
affects importantly the three major aspects of the business-government relationship – its 
character, structure and composition (See Figure 1b). The following sub-sections will 
look in a greater detail into these dependencies. 
EU Accession
______________________________________
Legal Financial Capacity
Conditionalities       Assistance                Building
Business-Government Relationship
______________________________________
Character        Structure         Composition
Domestic Preparation 
for EU Accession
Figure 1b
 
Legal Conditionalities and Harmonization 
Membership conditionality is the most important mechanism through which the 
EU exerts influence on accession countries and their domestic actors.
13 Conditionality 
                                                 
12 Similarly, H. Grabbe describes five categories of mechanisms that effect change through EU 
conditionality: (1) models: provision of legislative and institutional templates; (2) money: aid and technical 
assistance; (3) benchmarking and monitoring; (4) advice and twinning; and (5) gate-keeping: access to 
negotiations and further stages in the accession process (Grabbe, 2006: 76-89). 
13 Typically EU conditionality is seen as a formal instrument for the transposition of EU rules, norms and 
institutional templates to the CEE countries. Hughes et al. develop a process-based model of conditionality; 
they define conditionality by the process of its application rather than by an ideal-type assumed power   17
denotes deliberate efforts to determine the process’s outcome through external pressure. 
This is achieved through specifying conditions or even preconditions for support, 
involving either promise of material aid or political opportunities. The historical 
experience with European integration reveals that during all enlargement rounds, the 
question of EU accession has revolved around the fundamental requirement for the 
acceptance of the supremacy of the EU common law, the acquis communautaire, over 
domestic legislation, the creation of mechanisms for its transposition into national 
legislation, and for its subsequent practical implementation and monitoring.  
  Compared with previous enlargements, specific for the conditions of CEE 
countries’ accession was the higher threshold of conditionalities. The eastward expansion 
of the EU towards the formerly communist countries reflected conflicting pressures 
among and within member states. On the one hand, in light of political and security 
benefits, the EU favored prospective membership by the CEE countries. On the other 
hand, conscious of the great diversity of the CEE countries, especially in economic 
levels, the EU was highly hesitant in making more concrete and detailed commitments to 
enlargement. Notable in this regard were the concerns of the poorer members of the EU 
such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, that important EU structural funds that were going to 
them might be diverted to the CEE candidates. 
As a result, the EU committed itself to an eastward expansion only within the 
framework of a complex set of conditions whereby the CEE countries would be 
committed to adopting certain fixed and core democratic, economic, and constitutional 
principles of EU governance. The EU’s accession criteria for CEE applicants included, 
firstly, the basic democratic and free-market-oriented principles and primary provisions 
of the internal market acquis, which form the core of the EU (as stipulated in the Europe 
Agreements, although these agreements did not discuss accession); secondly, the three 
basic criteria for membership that were outlined by the Copenhagen European Council 
(1993) in the areas of political democratization, market reform, and judicial and 
administrative adaptations (the 1995 White Paper on the Single Market strengthened 
economic conditions with more detailed provisions on the internal market); and thirdly, 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship, typical for the conventional model of conditionality. According to their model, conditionality 
is the interaction between multi-level actors, perceptions, interests, different rewards and sanctions, 
temporal factors, institutional and policy compliance (Hughes et al., 2004).   18
individually crafted aims for each CEE applicant country, through the reinforced pre-
accession strategy and the accession partnership agreements concluded in 1998. The 1998 
agreements extended the requirements not only by making further negotiations 
conditional upon the CEE ability to adopt and implement each EU goal as it is stipulated, 
but also by making financial assistance under the PHARE program conditional upon such 
progress. 
The “Association” or “Europe” agreements, signed between December 1991 and 
spring 1993, proposed not accession but association. Specifically, they laid down a 
variety of conditions for better “association.” These included “the stability of institutions 
in the candidate country guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for minorities” (European Commission 1993:2). The agreements were also 
designed to reaffirm the commitment of the CEE countries to the principles of the market 
economy and social justice as the basis for association, and to make their economies 
competitive with the western European economies. The association agreements turned 
out to be considerably below the expectations of the CEE countries. The European 
market was opened asymmetrically to the CEE countries – the opening did not include 
the sensitive sectors of the EU such as coal, steel, textile and agriculture, which are 
actually the sectors where the CEE economies have some competitive edge. Besides, the 
EU rejected financially binding commitments in the agreements (Agh 1996: 9-10). 
Despite the absence of any commitment to accession in the agreements, and their clear 
intent to impose protectionist policies, the association agreements provided international 
political approval for processes of post-communist transformation, and policymakers and 
the public in the countries of CEE heralded the agreements as an act of high politics, “a 
dictate of the times,” and a political acknowledgment of the end of the Cold War. 
The Copenhagen Council decisions of June 1993 provided that the Europe 
Agreement countries could become members of an enlarged EU as soon as they fulfilled 
certain general criteria for accession. The EU set three main criteria for beginning 
accession talks with the CEE applicants for membership: stable political institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities; a 
functioning market economy that can withstand competitive pressure from other EU 
countries; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence   19
to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union, implementation of the EU’s 
common law or acquis communautaire, and administrative and judicial capacity 
(European Council in Copenhagen, 21-23 June 1993, cf. Conclusions of the Presidency, 
SN 180/93, p. 13). There were a lot of analytical difficulties in interpreting the EU’s 
accession conditionality. The three main conditions were extremely broad, highly 
debatable and slippery concepts. In addition, they were a moving target, an evolving 
process, and the linkage between fulfilling particular tasks and receiving particular 
benefits was not clear because the tasks were complex and many of them were not 
amenable to quantitative targets that showed explicitly when they had been fulfilled 
(Nello & Smith, 1997; Grabbe, 2006: 31-37). 
  The year 1997 marked a turning point in the evolution of EU conditions. The 
European Commission’s blueprint for enlargement, “Agenda 2000,” and the 
Commission’s opinions (avis) of the ten CEE applicants for EU membership, issued in 
July 1997, opened the negotiation process and further outlined the conditions for 
accession of CEE countries to the EU. These documents also differentiated between two 
groups of applicant countries: fast-track (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia 
and Estonia, plus Cyprus) and slow-track (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Slovakia). In an attempt to soften the impact of accession and differentiation, and as a 
concession to the slow-track applicants, in 1998 the Commission drew up contracts for 
EU membership known as “accession partnerships." They proposed further strengthening 
the pre-accession strategy for each applicant country, whatever stage it has reached in the 
transition process. 
The reinforced pre-accession strategy had two main objectives. The first was to 
channel some portion of financial assistance funds from all available sources—that is, 
from PHARE and international financial institutions—into the implementation of 
national programs to help prepare the applicant nations to meet the requirements for 
membership. Among the objectives and necessary commitments were reinforcement of 
democracy and the rule of law; protection of minorities; macroeconomic stabilization; 
enhancement of institutional and administrative capacity; preparation for full 
participation in the internal market; attention to justice and home affairs, agriculture, the 
environment, transport, employment, and social affairs; adjustment, as necessary, of   20
regional policy and cohesion; adherence to nuclear safety guidelines; and the adoption of 
the acquis communautaire within a precise timetable, focusing on the priority areas 
identified in each opinion. The second broad aim of the strategy was to familiarize the 
applicants with Union policies and procedures by inviting them to participate in 
Community programs. 
  Monitoring was a key mechanism in the conditionality for membership, through 
the cycle of accession partnerships and regular reports published by the EC on how 
prepared each CEE applicant was in different fields. This process provided the EU with a 
subtle and highly effective route of direct influence on domestic policy-making. The 
regular reports judged the performance of lower-level officials within the ministries, but 
also of other societal actors including business (Grabbe, 2006: 83). 
Similarly to the Europeanization of EU member states, which refers 
predominantly to the emergence and development at the European level of distinct 
structures of governance, and their impact on the domestic institutions and actors of 
member states (Ladrech, 1994; Olsen, 1995a and 1996; Andersen and Eliassen, 1993; 
Rometsch and Wessels, 1996; Mény, Muller, and Quermonne, 1996; Forder and Menon, 
1998; Risse et al., 2001),
14 Europeanization of accession countries through legal 
conditionalities recognizes the existence of important interactions among several levels of 
governance (European supranational, national, and subnational). Unlike the 
Europeanization of member states, however, the Europeanization of candidate countries 
and their domestic actors and institutions through legal conditionalities and 
harmonization is characterized with interactions and linkages between national and 
European levels that are not so close and continuous. If for EU member states the causal 
processes ultimately go both ways – activities at the domestic level affect the European 
level and vice versa (Risse et al., 2001; Goetz, 2002)
15 – for EU candidate countries the 
                                                 
14 In their influential book Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change Cowles, 
Caporaso and Risse, for example, understand Europeanization as the emergence and the development at the 
European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions 
associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy 
networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. Political institutionalization involves 
the development of formal and informal rules, procedures, norms, and practices governing politics at the 
European, national, and subnational levels (Cowles et al., 2001: 3). 
15 As some authors have noted, for member states it is hard to even speak of levels in a system in which 
European and domestic influences are so thoroughly melded (Risse et al., 2001: 2; Rometsch and Wessels, 
1996).   21
levels are much less interdependent, and there are in fact a lot of power asymmetries. 
They stem from the limited opportunities of the acceding countries to negotiate 
derogations or transition periods because of the non-negotiability of the acquis 
communautaire. However, understood is a solid promise that possible reforms to reflect 
the individual preferences of new members would take place after enlargement. 
Overall, Europeanization through legal conditionalities and harmonization 
changes nation-states and their domestic actors and institutions by exerting adaptational 
pressures. In that regard, the major questions that inform this study are: How have the 
pressures stemming from the harmonization of domestic law with the EU common law 
affected the character of the business-government relationship in EU acceding countries – 
has the latter become more corporatist–collaborative or more neo-liberal–conflictual? 
What formal/informal channels of communication and institutions of interaction have 
emerged to help with the harmonization of legislation? Has the legal harmonization effort 
changed in any way the composition of the relationship, that is, the internal 
constituencies of both business and government, and in what direction and at what levels? 
 
 Financial  Aid 
Financial assistance from the EU to the CEE applicants dates back to the late 
1980s, as a response to the revolutions in the region. In July 1989, the G24 countries (the 
Group of 24 western industrial countries)
16 decided to assist reforms in Poland, Hungary, 
and throughout the region, with EC coordination. The EC held a special informal summit 
of heads of governments in November 1989 to discuss the challenge of revolution in the 
east. The Summit agreed to support reform through the creation of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the opening up of EU programs in 
education, training, and technology. In December 1989, the Council adopted the PHARE 
Program. Until 1997, PHARE was oriented towards a broad range of goals connected 
with transition towards pluralist democracy and market economy, largely through 
technical assistance. PHARE was demand-driven, allowing CEE governments to 
formulate their own requests in the fields of institutional reform and infrastructure 
                                                 
16 The 24 were the EU–15, the U.S., Canada, Australia, Turkey, New Zealand, Switzerland, Japan, Norway 
and Iceland.   22
development. Projects were awarded to consultants under a competitive tendering process, 
but without a policy framework, so there was little opportunity for consistent and 
persistent influence from the EU. Besides, foreign financial aid, including PHARE, while 
viewed as crucial for the adjustment periods, has proven marginal to the needs of the 
transition process (Wedel, 1998; Bideleux, 1996; Mayhew, 1998: 135). 
  With the advancement of the accession process, the EU has committed itself to an 
unprecedented pre-accession financial assistance, of more than 3 billion Euro per year, to 
help the candidates duly prepare for membership. This money was channeled through 
three pre-accession instruments. In addition to PHARE, in 2000 the EU created ISPA and 
SAPARD. PHARE’s two main priorities became institution-building, with a stress on 
training of public servants (30% of funds), and development of infrastructure (70%), 
concentrating on transport and environmental projects. Investment support was given to 
strengthen the regulatory infrastructure needed to comply with the acquis, and also for 
economic and social cohesion measures similar to those supported in the member-states 
through the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund. ISPA 
provided structural funds money to contribute to accession preparations specifically in the 
area of economic and social cohesion, which covered environmental measures and 
transport infrastructure measures. SAPARD funds contributed to the implementation of 
the acquis concerning the common agricultural policy and related policies, and could also 
be used to solve specific problems in adapting the agricultural sector and rural areas to EU 
membership. 
  Half of the overall pre-accession assistance per year during the 2000-2006 period 
was allocated to PHARE. The precise appropriation for 2001 were 540 million Euro for 
SAPARD, 1.08 billion Euro for ISPA, and 1.62 Euro for PHARE, amounting to an 
overall budget of 3.24 billion Euro (European Commission, 2002a: 7). Meanwhile, the 
EU deepened its cooperation with the international financial institutions. The latter and 
especially the World Bank have been actively involved in the preparations of the CEE 
countries for accession. As Grabbe observed, however, aid money to the candidates was 
disbursed through an inflexible bureaucratic process. It was thus hard to use it as a carrot 
to get the countries to move in a particular direction. Moreover, EU aid to CEE was still 
small compared with FDI inflows for the front-runner candidates, so withdrawal of aid   23
was not a heavy sanction economically. Nevertheless, the political embarrassment a 
withdrawal caused could be effective (Grabbe, 2006: 81-82). 
Once an applicant country becomes a member of the EU, it can receive aid 
through the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund of the EU. These are the main 
financial instruments of the EU for achieving the main objectives of its regional policy – 
reduction of regional development disparities within the EU regions. The Structural 
Funds comprise the European Fund for Regional Development, the European Social Fund, 
the European Fund for Agricultural Guidance and Guarantees – section Orientation, and 
the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance. The European Regional Development 
Fund is the most important mechanism for carrying of the common regional policy of the 
EU, with the goal to reduce regional disparities in the Union in the field of development 
and living standards. The major goal of the European Social Fund is the provision of 
financial support in the fight against unemployment, mainly through financing measures 
for education and training of unemployed, easy access to the labor market, creation of 
equal opportunities at the labor market, development of skills and professional 
qualification, and encouragement of the creation of jobs. The European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund facilitates the implementation of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. It finances measures for the development of rural regions and support of farmers. 
And the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance is designed to help for the 
restructuring, adaptation and modernization of the fisheries industry. The Cohesion Fund 
of the EU targets environmental improvement and development of transport networks. 
Accession countries had to develop capacity to utilize these funds before 
accession. Resources from the funds could be granted to member states only on the basis 
of strategic programming, or the preparation of multi-annual strategic framework 
programs and their implementation through the financing of projects targeted at carrying 
out the programmed actions and achieving the desired results. This is also a process in 
which more concrete operational programs have to be developed. These programs define 
the channeling of resources for meeting certain priority needs as specified in the strategic 
framework program. 
In the case of Europeanization through financial aid, the major questions that 
interest this study are: How are the provisions, requirements and procedures of pre-  24
accession financial assistance inducing change in the character of the business-
government relationship in EU acceding countries – has the latter become more 
collaborative or more adversarial, especially in regard to the redistribution of financial 
resources? Have any formal and informal channels of communication and institutions of 
interaction emerged in regard to the management of the EU structural funds? Have the 
procedures of pre-accession and post-accession financial assistance affected in any way 
the composition of the business-government relationship, that is, the internal 
constituencies of both business and government, and in what direction and at what levels? 
 
 Capacity  Building 
Europeanization is further fostered through capacity building and a learning 
process of how to operate as a future member, how to upload domestic preferences once 
EU membership is achieved.
17 More specifically, Europeanization through capacity 
building and learning is a process in which European institutions and political elites 
devote resources to enticing important domestic actors to learn to get involved in Euro-
level processes, to learn how to participate in European-level decision-making. The 
process of learning how to take part in the Euro-level policy-making activities would 
actually become a process of uploading of domestic preferences to the European level 
after accession is achieved. At the accession preparatory stage this process includes 
learning about representation and participation in the EU common policies and how to 
influence them, as well as how to manage the EU structural and cohesion funds. All this 
involves major changes in the internal administrative structures of applicant states and 
preparation of domestic actors such as business for EU membership. 
In the case of Europeanization through capacity building, several questions 
inform this study: Has the process of learning how to operate in the EU multi-level 
governance system and how to participate in EU-level policy making altered in any way 
the character of the business-government relationship, making it more collaborative or 
more conflictual? Have any specific channels of business-government communication 
emerged related to the learning process, such as learning committees and networks, 
                                                 
17 One of Grabbe’s five mechanisms of influence of the EU over acceding countries is “advice and 
twinning” which is quite similar to the Learning factor as described here.   25
across business and government, and within their segments? What specific segments or 
internal constituencies of businesses and governments have been included in the learning 
process, or has the latter affected in any way the composition of the business-government 
relationship in an EU acceding country? 
 
Dimensions of the Europeanization of Business-Government Relations 
The Bulgarian case reveals that the actual effects of EU accession on the 
business-government relationship in an accession country could be traced along the lines 
of three major developments: greater collaboration through endorsement of the 
partnership principle; greater institutionalization and multi-level interaction; and 
strengthening of the executive on the side of the state and consolidation of business as 
capital, sector, and political organization, as well as embedment of the business-
government relationship into organized civil society (See Table 1).
18 
 
Table 1.  
 
 
EU 
ACCESSION 
 
Character  
of the business-
government relationship 
 
 
Structure  
of the business-
government 
relationship 
 
Composition  
of the business-
government 
relationship 
 
Legal 
conditionalities 
and 
harmonization 
 
 
* collaborative through 
endorsement of the 
partnership principle and 
accent on shared social 
governance; 
* conflicts are predominantly 
technical in character: 
- competition in regard to 
who is the better expert on the 
issues under negotiation with 
the EU; 
- disagreement over 
postponement of some 
regulations; 
 
* direct involvement of 
business in the accession 
negotiations; 
* emergence of new 
institutions of interaction 
(consultative councils, 
public-private partnerships); 
* emergence of a multi-level 
structure of interaction. 
* conflicts based on lack of 
information flows and lack 
of endorsement of mutually 
agreed positions in the 
actual negotiations with the 
 
* dominance of the 
executive; 
* strengthening of 
business as political 
organization, also as 
capital and sector; 
* embedment of the 
relationship into 
organized civil 
society (social 
dialogue & 
Economic and 
Social Council). 
 
                                                 
18 Lavdas (1997) identifies a dual impact of EC membership on domestic government-business relations: 
indirect and direct. It helps reshape the relationship’s environment but it also influences, more directly, the 
relations themselves, their forms and contents. The direct impact has resulted in organizational 
development for the peak business organization in Greece, the Federation of Greek Industries (SEV). 
European integration also affects the channels, points of access and lobbying strategies of interest groups; it 
also influences the domestic organizational patterns and modes of interaction with governments.   26
- information and 
communication issues. 
 
EU. 
 
Financial aid 
 
 
* reinforcement of the 
partnership principle through: 
- strategic programming for 
the utilization of the EU 
structural funds and the 
Cohesion Fund; 
- building of absorption 
capacity for the utilization of 
the funds; 
- joint monitoring and control 
of the funds; 
* conflicts over technical 
issues (who is the better 
expert in terms of proposing 
better schemes for the 
effective utilization of the 
funds). 
 
 
* joint working groups over 
the preparation of all 
programming documents for 
the 2007-2013 programming 
period; 
* creation of joint 
monitoring and control 
committees; 
* creation of mutual 
partnerships over the 
distribution of financial aid. 
 
* dominance of the 
executive; 
* strengthening of 
business as political 
organization; 
* embedment of the 
relationship into 
organized civil 
society. 
 
 
Capacity 
Building 
 
 
* expansion of the partnership 
principle to the EU level. 
 
* emergence of new 
domestic institutions of 
interaction; 
* emergence of multi-level 
institutions and structures 
for the preparedness of 
domestic actors for EU 
membership: 
- institutional twinning; 
- joint consultative 
committees on economic 
and social issues between 
the EU and the accession 
country; 
- creation of Euro-Info 
Centers. 
 
 
* EU-level 
governing bodies 
involved in tandem 
with the executive 
(EC; EP; ESC); 
* strengthening of 
transnational 
business 
organization; 
* new role of 
domestic business 
organizations as 
facilitators of 
business adaptation 
for EU membership. 
 
Character: Endorsement of the Partnership Principle 
Legal Conditionalities. The most notable effect of the EU legal conditionalities 
for membership was the endorsement of the partnership principle and the accent on 
shared social governance. Social dialogue involving governments, business and labor has 
always been a central element of the European social model, one which has accompanied 
European integration from the very beginning. With the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, social dialogue became a means of transposing Community directives 
at national level. As stipulated in the Treaty, a lot of Community directives may be   27
implemented in the member states by means of either legal harmonization or agreements 
between the social partners. As a result, the social partners in the EU have become key 
actors in what some experts define as “shared social governance’ (Vaughan-Whitehead, 
1999: 2). In the process of accession negotiations the Commission actively promoted this 
new understanding of social dialogue not so much as a means for mediation and 
conciliation but as a new form of policy making, as a collaborative governance 
mechanism. Overall, the message from Brussels was for the encouragement of the 
cooperation between the social partners in order to be able to participate in the self-
regulation of the integrated European market and the achievement of greater 
competitiveness of the national economies. 
However, the implementation of Community legislation through agreements 
between the social partners rather than national legislation requires strong social dialogue 
and collective bargaining structures, and representative employer and employee 
organizations to ensure the effective implementation of national agreements at lower 
levels. The lack of these conditions in candidate countries predetermined the 
transposition of EU common law through national legislation rather than through 
agreements between the social partners. None of the new EU member states or still 
candidate countries has used the option of national agreements between the social 
partners for the transposition of EU legislation (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 237). Besides, 
the social partners are still lacking the expert capacity in order to be legislators and 
political consultants. And the state still holds a monopoly position in the decision-making 
process and the accession process in particular, which allows for the selective 
consideration of the different proposals that come from business and other groups. 
Despite of this drawback, the EU used another tool for the strengthening of the 
institution of social dialogue in EU accession countries and converting it into a shared 
social governance mechanism. It encouraged the active engagement of the social partners 
in consultations over the harmonization of domestic legislation with the EU common law. 
The reasons for this are rooted in the necessity for the achievement of broad public 
consensus regarding the decision for joining the EU and the redrafting of political 
priorities. There was a belief that the participation of the social partners in the accession 
process would help at a later stage for the effective and qualitative implementation of the   28
European common law, the acquis communautaire, at firm, branch and regional levels. 
The necessity for active participation of the social partners in accession negotiations also 
stemmed from the fact that many EU directives specify such involvement of the social 
partners at national level, especially those directives that are focused on health and safety 
issues in the EU (Lado and Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 78). 
Overall, the EU insisted from the very start of the accession process that business 
and labor as the two major “social partners” to the government have to be included in the 
elaboration of the government positions on each negotiation chapter of the acquis. The 
EU strongly promoted dialogue and supported the professional organizations of business 
and other segments of civil society, in an effort to create a functioning civil society in 
acceding countries, one in which consultation by the government would be an integral 
part of the policy-making process. The idea was to help the professional organizations 
prepare for a post-accession active participation and involvement in the EU’s multi-level 
governance system. 
Conflicts between government and business in regard to the legal conditionalities 
and harmonization requirements emerged but they were predominantly technocratic and 
technical in character. Thus most of the tensions arose as a result of competition in regard 
to who is the better expert on the issues under negotiation with the EU. Another hotly 
debated area included the necessity of postponement of some of the regulations because 
of the great hardship that they would impose on business, with the ultimate result being 
its decreased competitiveness on the EU single market. Furthermore, under pressure from 
business, and as part of the legal harmonization effort, the state had to undertake 
initiatives to improve the general business environment by relaxing the administrative 
regulations towards business, reducing the licensing and registration regimes and 
regulations, and making the business environment more transparent and less corrupt. 
Conflicts between business and government in regard to the EU legal conditionalities 
were also based on lack of information flows and lack of endorsement of mutually agreed 
positions during the actual negotiations with the EU. 
Financial Aid. The partnership principle was further reinforced through the design 
and use of pre-accession and post-accession financial instruments, such as strategic 
programming; building of absorption capacity for the utilization of the funds; and joint   29
monitoring and control of the funds. In this specific context, the partnership principle 
implies close cooperation between the EU Commission, central and sub-national 
governments, the business sector and NGOs, in order to achieve common development 
objectives. The principle of partnership requires the partners to present their opinions and 
proposals in a transparent way during the preparation, financing, monitoring and 
assessment of projects. All money which come from the EU funds have to be spent for 
such activities for which there is a consensus among the partners. Even more broadly, 
partnership is increasingly perceived as a value, method of work or “culture’ 
underpinning structural funds and as a practical tool to ensure the full commitment 
(moral and financial) of partners to agreed priorities and objectives. Furthermore, the 
need to include the social partners in the management of the EU structural funds 
(especially the European Social Fund) is seen as an important milestone in securing their 
capacity to participate in social dialogue as a meaningful mechanism of shared social 
governance. 
 Capacity  Building. The capacity building imperative further strengthened the 
partnership principle and expanded it to the EU level. With European integration, 
business and other segments of civil society no longer look at their national governments 
as the sole source of economic and social policy; governments share this function with 
the EU’s policy-making institutions. Hence a multi-dimensional approach is emerging as 
a major change in the business-government relationship. Business and government have 
to learn how to operate at multiple levels of governance, and how to incorporate the 
European context even when dealing with very specific micro issues at the local level. 
 
Structure: Multi-Level Institutionalization 
  Legal Conditionalities. As part of the legal harmonization efforts, business 
became directly involved in the accession negotiations through participation in most of 
the institutional structures that were specifically established in order to facilitate 
accession. This included participation in the thirty working groups which were formed on 
the basis of the sections of the EU common law. The working groups comprised 
representatives not only of the state ministries but also of the social partners, civil society 
and political institutions. They formed the extended negotiation team of each accession   30
country, with the task to handle the entire preparation of the negotiation process on a 
sector by sector basis. More specifically, the groups’ tasks focused on the preparation of 
draft negotiation positions by sectors, as well as general positions on the conformity of 
draft laws with the acquis, and on the national priorities in the respective industry/field. 
In addition, business participated in newly emerged institutions and structures of 
interaction, such as consultative councils on European integration at the various 
ministries where the various challenges of the acquis were discussed on a sector by sector 
basis. Another institutional development was the creation of public-private partnerships 
in order to meet the EU legal requirements of accession, especially in the area of 
environmental protection where a lot of financial resources were needed for the 
harmonization of domestic legislation with the EU environmental acquis. 
  Financial Aid. In regard to the utilization of EU funds, working groups and 
commissions were also created, permanent or temporary according to the tasks that they 
fulfill. These working groups take decisions for the utilization of the structural and 
cohesion funds, and determine the development of regions and the country as a whole. 
Plans (strategies) and operational programs for the utilization of EU funds have to be 
presented to the EC only after consultations with partners. Partners also have to be 
involved in the monitoring committees of operational programs. Public-private 
partnerships were also developed in regard to the utilization of EU funds. The PPP is a 
long-term contractual relationship among persons from the private and the public sector 
for the financing, construction, reconstruction, management and maintenance of 
infrastructure with the goal of achieving better level of services. Partnerships were 
recommended for attracting the co-financing needed to utilize the structural funds. 
  Capacity Building. The learning process in regard to state officials was realized 
through the formal institutional, policy and financial links between the EU and the CEE 
applicants, which are aimed at facilitating the institutionalization and domestic 
preparation of government officials and public administration, the judiciary and 
parliaments in general for EU membership. These were, first, the intergovernmental 
institutional structures of association and accession that developed on the basis of the 
Europe agreements (association councils, association committees, association 
parliamentary committees), and were specifically created to ease and facilitate the   31
process of accession and domestic adaptation. The association councils comprised 
members of the European Council and the European Commission, together with members 
of the governments or experts appointed by the governments. The association committees 
prepared the ground for decision-making and comprised members of the Council and 
Commission of the EU, on the one hand, and representatives of the government of the 
associated country, on the other hand, at senior civil servant level. Importantly, the work 
of the association committees involved actors beyond governments on both sides, such as 
economic agents, usually from the business communities, representatives of EU 
institutions, and various social groups affected by the accession process. The association 
councils could also establish specialized committees on more specific issues related to 
agriculture, transport, economic policy, harmonization of national law with the EU 
common law, and policy relating to competition. These specialized committees also 
involved representatives of the business communities. The association parliamentary 
committees enabled members of the parliaments of the associated countries to meet and 
exchange views with members of the European Parliament. The joint parliamentary 
committees were complemented by parliamentary standing committees on transport, 
industry, trade, fiscal policy, foreign policy, and other sectors in which the EU applicants 
had to harmonize their policies and legislation with those of the EU. 
Second, the EU provided a wide range of policy advice to CEE through the 
technical assistance offered by the PHARE program from 1989 to 1997 and through the 
twinning program that started in 1999. TAIEX (the Technical Assistance Information 
Exchange Office) also provided experts to give short-term advice. The EU’s efforts were 
supplemented by SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in 
Central and Eastern European countries), an OECD body funded by PHARE that 
provided advice on horizontal government functions. Furthermore, institutional twinning 
was aimed at helping CEE countries to adapt their administrative and democratic 
institutions to comply with membership requirements by learning from member-state 
experiences of framing the legislation, and building the organizational capacity necessary 
to implement the acquis. The program used PHARE funds to pay for the secondment of 
officials from EU member states to work in CEE ministries and other parts of the public 
administration (that is, institutions, professional organizations, agencies, and European   32
and regional bodies). Under twinning, EU servants worked alongside CEE counterparts 
and taught them how to do things the EU way although the advice and expertise offered 
by the twinning agents was not controlled centrally by the EU (Lohan, 1998; Grabbe, 
2006: 85-86). Twinning combined different means, such as short-term expertise, training, 
services (translation and interpreting in particular), and specialized help (such as 
specialized computer software), in addition to the pre-accession advisors. Initially, 
twinning focused on the fields of agriculture, environment, public finance, justice and 
home affairs, and regional policy. By 2001 the twinning instrument covered the whole 
body of the acquis in all its diversity. During the 1998-2002 period, a total of 684 
twinning projects were programmed. Their implementation often involved more than one 
member state (European Commission, 2002a: 8). 
The learning process in regard to public interest groups, including business, 
focused on the creation of joint consultative committees on economic and social issues 
between the EU and each candidate country. Members of these committees represented, 
respectively, employers’ organizations, chambers of commerce, trade unions, and 
organizations of farmers, consumers, and women, from both an acceding country and EU 
member states. The committees were set up to pave the way for enlargement of the EU 
by promoting dialogue and supporting the professional organizations in acceding 
countries in their efforts to create a functioning civil society, one in which their 
consultation by the government would be an integral part of the decision-making process. 
Another task of the joint consultative committees was to promote dialogue and 
cooperation between the economic and social interest groups in the European Union and 
those in acceding countries. The dialogue covers all economic and social aspects of the 
relations between the EU and acceding countries in light of the Association/Europe 
Agreements and the Accession Partnership Agreements between the EU and each of them. 
  Membership in European interest organizations, broad interaction with the 
respective counterparts from EU member states, and participation in European-level 
structures became another important learning component for the social partners in 
accession countries. Their involvement in EU-level social dialogue would give them an 
opportunity to discuss their problems in a wider context, and contribute to the design of 
appropriate European policies in the long run. It may also help them face the new   33
difficulties that may emerge with the prospect of EU enlargement, such as risks of social 
dumping for the west, or brain-drain for the east, which the social partners from neither 
the accession countries nor the old EU member states would be able to tackle alone. In 
addition, the EU and the EU-level business organizations provided training and 
educational assistance on the effective participation in the processes of strategic planning 
and programming; development and fulfillment of projects, education for building 
capacity for strategic planning and programming; and development of skills for the 
creation of partnerships and partnership mechanisms. 
The learning process specifically in regard to the business communities in EU 
applicant countries encompassed the emergence of new institutional ties and networks for 
the preparation of business in meeting the challenges of EU accession and membership, 
especially in regard to those business segments that would be mostly affected by 
competitive pressures in an enlarged EU. The process involved the formation of both 
purely business – domestic and transnational – networks on capacity building, on the one 
hand, and mixed ones, including business and governance structures from the various 
levels of the EU multi-governance system, on the other. Thus more or less formalized ties 
emerged between businesses of EU member countries and those of an acceding country. 
Links also intensified between the supranational, EU-level business organizations such as 
UNICE and ERT, on the one hand, and national businesses and business organizations, 
on the other. 
 
Composition: Embedment into Organized Civil Society 
Legal Conditionalities & Financial Aid. The legal harmonization effort as well as 
the mechanisms for management of the EU funds clearly endorsed the dominance of the 
executive vis-à-vis the parliament but the role of parliament in the accession process 
naturally increased with the opening of accession negotiations as only the parliament has 
the authority to change the legislation in a way that makes it compliant with the EU 
common law. However, business lobbying continued to target predominantly the 
different branches of the executive rather than the parliamentary commissions, because 
the draft laws came to parliament and its commissions in an almost accomplished form.   34
Legal harmonization and EU financial aid requirements strengthened business as 
political organization, that is, it increased the role of business associations vis-à-vis the 
state – at the national but also at the branch level. Individual companies did participate in 
the accession negotiations as derogations and transition periods referred mostly to 
individual companies, not whole sectors. However, business organizations were the 
major participants in all working groups on accession, not individual companies. The 
participation of individual companies as well as business organizations in the accession 
negotiations had its industry specifics. For example, individual companies were more 
important in specific industries, such as oil, while business organizations, in contrast, 
were more important in sectors such as agriculture and food processing. Furthermore, 
business organizations not individual companies are also the major participants in all 
programming and monitoring institutions that emerged in response to the utilization of 
EU funds. 
Most importantly, the legal requirements of EU accession endorsed the 
embedment of the business-government relationship into organized civil society, through 
the system of social dialogue. In the course of eastern enlargement the EU insisted on the 
broadening of the scope of participants in social dialogue, for the inclusion not only of 
the organizations of employers and employees but also all other formations that have 
economic or social role. In that regard, an accession requirement was added for the 
creation of permanent economic and social councils in each candidate country before 
accession. The idea was to transform the existing forms of tripartism at the national level 
into broader forms of civic dialogue, including in addition to the social partners 
(employers and labor unions) other interests from the third sector, and at the same time to 
provide to the social partners a separate arena for negotiations without the participation of 
the state, in the form of so called bipartite or autonomous social dialogue. 
  Economic and social councils were created in each accession country. They have 
been modeled on the European Economic and Social Council, as consultative organs 
representing the views of civil society on the economic and social development of an 
acceding country. The councils are structured into three groups – employers, employees, 
and various interests. The councils became a constant institutional form of social 
dialogue in the area of economic and social policy between the government and the   35
structures of civil society. Their task is to develop opinions on draft laws, national 
programs and plans regarding the economic and social development of the country; 
opinions on legal acts of the national parliaments regarding issues of economic and social 
development; opinions on strategic problems of the government’s economic and social 
policy; and annual memorandums and analyses of the economic and social development 
of the country. 
  Capacity Building. The capacity building imperative endorsed the expansion of 
the business-government relationship to also include actors from the EU level as well as 
individual actors from EU member states, in a joint effort to prepare business and 
government for EU membership. The learning process thus strengthened the multi-level 
governance mechanism, as well as the transnational business organization. More or less 
formalized ties emerged between businesses of EU member countries and those of an 
acceding country. Links also intensified between the supranational, EU-level business 
organizations such as UNICE and ERT, on the one hand, and national businesses and 
business organizations, on the other. Furthermore, as part of the capacity building efforts, 
domestic business organizations developed a new role as facilitators of the adaptation of 
individual companies (predominantly SMEs) for EU membership. 
 
Level of Efficiency of the Business-Government Relationship in Achieving the 
National Goal of EU Accession 
The relationship between business and government has been an important variable 
in explaining economic performance and development (Maxfield and Schneider, 1997). 
The structure of the business-government relationship has always been considered as 
important one for the achievement of shared economic objectives (Wislon, 1990) or 
economic performance in developing countries (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997). 
Institutionalist analyses of development have often concluded that relations between 
business and government account for a large part of the variation in economic 
performance (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1989; Doner, 1991; Thorp, 1991). As Schneider and 
Maxfield conclude, in all these development studies in various regions of the world the 
dependent variable changes from growth to state effectiveness to bargaining performance,   36
but in each case relations between business and the state had a decisive impact on 
economic outcomes (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997: 6-7). 
Has the business-government relationship emerged as a major domestic 
facilitating factor for the preparedness of a candidate country for EU accession? Has it 
been effective in promoting EU accession? Accession-driven institutional change in the 
EU-acceding countries is based on deliberately created facilitating factors because where 
adaptational pressures exist, significant domestic change is not an automatic consequence. 
European signals are usually interpreted and modified through mediating factors such as 
domestic traditions, institutions, identities and resources. The mediating factors could 
both enable or block adaptational change.
19 They could also stem from both the European 
level and the domestic levels.  
For the EU accession countries, at least three macro- facilitating factors could be 
identified. These are, first, broad political and public consensus on accession; second, 
effective national accession strategies and institutions; and third, effective networks on 
accession. In that regard, the business-government relationship could play an important 
role, provided that, first, there is a broad consensus and support for EU accession among 
the business community; second, business is closely integrated into the national accession 
strategies and institutions; and third, close business-government networks have emerged 
with the goal to facilitate accession (See Figure 1c). 
                                                 
19 Risse et al. identify five such intervening factors: multiple veto points in the domestic structure, 
facilitating formal institutions, a country’s organizational and policymaking cultures, the differential 
empowerment of domestic actors, and learning (Risse et al., 2001).   37
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Accession to the EU is undoubtedly a highly shared objective by both 
governments and businesses, and it could be argued that since this issue is generally not 
dividing business and government, the dynamics of the relationship could contribute in a 
positive way for the achievement of the accession objective. There is a problem, however, 
with the meaningful inclusion of the business community in the national accession 
strategies and institutions. In the course of accession negotiations, such inclusion has 
generally been reduced to only some negotiation chapters of the acquis, and the business 
community has often complained that the voice of business is not well heard in the 
decision-making process on EU accession. As for the emergence of close business-
government networks on EU accession, such have undoubtedly emerged and have played 
a positive role in the preparedness of the business community for participation in the EU-
level institutions and policy procedures.  
However, while strong collaborative business-government networks can enhance 
performance and facilitate EU accession, they could be also subject to strong corrupting 
temptations. Moreover, the CEE region as a whole has much higher levels of corruption 
related to post-communist restructuring, especially privatization issues. The first general 
condition that can keep benign business-government collaboration from degenerating into 
collusion is an insulated bureaucracy characterized by meritocratic recruitment and   38
promotion, career service, and reasonable pay and prestige (Saxenian, 1994). However, 
such bureaucracies are scarce in both developing countries and transition economies. In 
their absence, other features of the state such as a hard budget constraint keep rent 
seeking in check. In still other cases, collective business action, or self-policing business 
associations work to minimize incentives for directly unproductive profit-seeking activity. 
Officials can delegate the administration of policy to associations that are better able than 
the delegating bureaucracies to restrain rent-seeking activities by their members, and thus 
reduce the likelihood that collaborative relations will degenerate into collusion and rent 
seeking (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997: 5). The insulation, not isolation of policy makers 
from societal pressures is essential for success and would allow a collaborative business-
government relationship to play an important facilitating role in achieving the national 
goal of EU accession. 
There are also micro- aspects of the relationship that can, in principle, enhance 
performance by both government and business. These include information, reciprocity, 
credibility, and trust. The close relations between business and government are 
particularly beneficial as a result of an increased flow of accurate, reliable information 
both sides. When a great deal of information flows easily from business to state actors, it 
can significantly improve the information base that officials use to evaluate policy 
options. Most policies aim to provoke some change in the behavior of private economic 
agents; therefore, the more accurately those policymakers can predict the responses of 
these agents, the more likely it is that the policy will have the desired effect. The timely 
flow of accurate and relevant information in the opposite direction, from state to business, 
can enhance performance on the business side. However, the exchange of information 
between business and state actors is complicated by information asymmetries and 
incentives on both sides to manipulate the exchange strategically (Schneider and 
Maxfield, 1997: 9). 
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